A few days after coming back from Houston, I had the pleasure of going up to Lowell, MA for jury duty.
While biding my time in the courthouse, it occurred to me that jury duty is much like reviewing. (Other people have, of course, made the same observation.) The review process is subject to much debate, e.g. these two blog entries. One difference for me is that I hope to never be on the other side in criminal proceedings, but I have and will continue to be on the other side in peer review.
What was the probability of my getting called to jury duty in Lowell, not being empanelled, getting released before lunchtime, stopping at the Burlington Mall for lunch but first walking into Sears to buy pants at the same time the principal chair of the trumpet section in my high school's wind ensemble during my freshman year is walking out of Sears, and remembering his name (Larry Chien) ten seconds later? There are many considerations in reporting probabilities of coincidental events after the fact, as discussed here recently in the context of primary elections in the city of my birth.
The juror's task in a criminal trial is to decide whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. He or she is supposed to not have prior biases, but is supposed to use intelligence. Are not priors a critical part of intelligence? I am not a philosopher and do not pretend to have any insight about this topic. Some quotations loosely related to the topic from things I have read recently:
The most important qualifications of a juror are fairness and impartiality. The juror must be led by intelligence, not by emotions, must put aside all bias and prejudice, must decide the facts and apply the law impartially.
It is a striking theorem of Bayesian analysis that, if the DM's prior distribution of the parameter p is sufficiently 'open minded', then, if the true value of p is p* (say), then the sequence of the DM's posterior distributions of p will become more and more concentrated in the neighborhood of p*. In other words, the DM will asymptotically learn the true value of the parameter p. By 'open minded' I mean, roughly speaking, that the DM does not rule out as impossible any value of the parameter between zero and one. Technical Note: More precisely, 'open minded' means that the support of the prior is the entire unit interval.
It was with a sense of bewilderment and confusion that I left Benares. Yet I was captivated by it all, and from that moment to this India has been to me the land of enduring and ever-increasing fascination, nor has a day passed without my learning something new and strange about the working of the Indian mentality. How to express the thing is difficult, but I may put it thus. As opposed to the Western mind, the Indian mind does not seem to be conditioned by facts. Take the most highly educated Indian graduate of Oxford or Cambridge, a man versed in the arts, sciences or philosophy. He will not think it incompatible with his learning to go on believing what he had been taught as a boy. He has absorbed a new knowledge but it has not displaced the old. Also, there seems to be a fusion in the Indian mind between myth and history, as though both were of a piece. Of Indian thinking as I encountered it at the end of the nineteenth century, the most consistent thing was inconsistency. Yet Indians in general are highly intelligent. Their lawyers are among the best, and their linguists and teachers compare favourably with those of any other people.
The trouble is that this traditional picture of the relation between deduction and induction conflates two quite different things, a theory of reasoning and a theory of what follows from what.
- Office of Jury Commissioner, Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1998). The Trial Juror's Handbook, Sixth Edition.
- Roy Radner (2005). Costly and Bounded Rationality in Individual and Team Decision-making. In: Understanding Industrial and Corporate Change. Oxford University Press.
- Sam Higginbottom (1949). Sam Higginbottom: Farmer, p. 53. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni (2007). Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory, p. 5. MIT Press.
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